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Abstract 
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed some light on which are the main capital 
structure determinants of the EU27 listed banking firms. Do the standard capital 
structure factors apply to this sample of banks? Or instead, are the regulatory capital and 
capital buffers the main factors considered by banks in their capital structure choice? 
Our results seem to indicate that, in some extent, standard cross-sectional determinants 
of non-financial firms’ capital structure also apply to our sample of EU27 listed banks, 
from 1998 to 2011. However, this evidence is stronger for market leverage than for 
book leverage. Controlling for asset risk does not exclude the remaining variables. In 
contrast, the regulatory view seems to have weaker explanatory power of banks’ capital 
structure changes. 
 
Keywords: banks, capital structure, leverage, capital regulation. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The firm’s capital structure refers to the combination of equity and long-term debt the 
company uses to finance its investments/assets. The source of capital can be internal, 
meaning cash flow from operations, or external, when the financial needs surpass the 
amount of cash-flow generated leading to the issuance of new equity or debt securities. 
These securities vary in terms of rights over the returns and the assets control. 
Moreover, accessing the markets to raise funds is costly. Since the choice of the capital 
structure, as all the other corporate finance decisions, is relevant to the firm’s value, it is 
particularly appropriate to consider the marginal costs of using each type of available 
funding. 
Since the theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958) which states that, in perfect 
capital markets, capital structure choice is irrelevant to firm value, many theoretical 
models have been proposed, based on the existing market imperfections, to respond to 
all these questions and to better understand why the capital structure decisions really 
matter. 
The static trade-off theory, in simple terms, assumes that the firm decides its 
sources of funding in order to find a debt ratio that maximizes the tax benefits offered 
by the interest payments on debt and minimize the probability of bankruptcy and the 
loss if a failure occurs. The Agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce the 
concept of agency costs, due to the conflicts of interest mainly between equityholders 
and managers and between debtholders and equityholders, and how it relates to the 
existence of an optimal mix of funding. 
Subsequently, asymmetric information based theories of capital structure arose. 
The pecking order theory suggests that firms have good reasons to avoid issuing 
common stock or other risky securities to finance new investments. Rather, they should 
accumulate operational cash-flow to prevent the dilemma of either passing by positive 
NPV projects or issuing stock at a low price. The signaling theory suggests that the 
market values the firm according to its perceived stream of returns. Thus, changes in the 
capital structure of such a firm may alter that market perception, since it leads to 
changes in the market perceived firm’s risk class although the actual risk class in fact 
remains unchanged. In their turn, underlying the market timing approach is the 
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empirical evidence that the observed capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the market, although it has limited explanatory power in the long-run. 
Some empirical studies on non-financial firms, have found that capital structure 
is cross-sectionally correlated with certain factors. Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest that 
leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and 
firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and 
development expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of the 
product. Frank and Goyal (2004) found that the most reliable factors in the leverage 
decisions are median industry leverage (positive effect), market-to-book ratio 
(negative), collateral (positive), profits (negative), dividend paying (negative), log of 
assets (positive), and expected inflation (positive). Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that 
leverage correlates positively with size and tangibility and negatively with market-to-
book ratio and profitability.  
Despite these important theoretical and empirical findings, some authors (e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2004) suggested that it is necessary to 
strengthen the relationship between these theoretical models of capital structure and the 
empirical facts. 
Furthermore, this empirical research is usually restricted to non-financial firms. 
Due to their special characteristics, financial firms (notably banks) have been excluded 
from corporate finance studies on capital structure determinants. Since banks are subject 
to a regulatory framework that establishes mandatory capital levels, they are involved in 
both voluntary and involuntary capital structure decisions (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; 
Marques and Santos, 2003). Moreover, banks raise most of their funds in the form of 
deposit contracts. Marques and Santos (2003) assert that “the investigation of capital 
structure of financial firms such as banks has been largely overlooked.” Gropp and 
Heider (2009) also conclude that, “there is a long tradition in corporate finance to 
investigate the capital structure decisions of non-financial firms. But what determines 
banks’ capital structures?” 
Aiming to answer this question, Gropp and Heider (2009), using a sample of 200 
large U.S. and European banks, examined whether the standard determinants of capital 
structure usually applied to non-financial firms (size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, 
asset tangibility, and dividend paying) are also relevant to banks. They also introduced 
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asset risk and macroeconomic factors. They further tested whether asset risk captures 
the effect of risk adjustments or if it rather excludes the corporate standard variables. 
Overall, their results show that standard corporate finance determinants of capital 
structure also apply to banks. Furthermore, their empirical facts suggest that capital 
regulation and capital buffers may only be of second order importance in determining 
the capital structure of most banks. 
The approach followed in this empirical study is similar to Gropp and Heider 
(2009). Using a sample of 145 listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies 
from 25 countries, between 1998 and 2011, we explore whether the standard 
determinants of capital structure are significant factors in determining the level of bank 
leverage in the European Union (EU27). We also control for asset risk and examine 
whether the regulatory framework, that imposes minimum capital ratios on banks, 
influences the choice of capital structure by banks. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview of the firm’s capital structure most prominent theories. Chapter 3 introduces 
the capital structure of banking firms. Chapter 4 comprises an empirical study to test 
whether standard determinants of capital structure have any explanatory power when 
applied to banks. We summarize and conclude in Chapter 5. 
  
4 
 
 
  
5 
 
Chapter 2 - Firm’s Capital Structure Theory: Overview of the 
Literature 
 
“The study of capital structure attempts to explain the mix of securities and financing 
sources used by corporations to finance real investment. […] There is no universal 
theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. There are several useful 
conditional theories, however.” 
(Myers, 2001) 
 
2.1. Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Theorem 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) is recognized as the seminal academic work on firm’s 
capital structure. In their study, the authors argue that, in perfect and frictionless 
markets, capital structure is irrelevant1. They suggest that capital structure should not 
influence the market value of the firm, based on a set of theoretical assumptions that 
have their basis in the market efficiency postulate. Therefore, we should look at the 
Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem as an outcome based on a theoretical 
corporate environment, without any kind of frictions and market imperfections2. 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller made a correction to their previous study which 
consist in introducing the effect of tax deductibility of interest payments in their model 
(the absence of taxes, previously considered one of the main assumptions, is now 
relaxed). Thus, the firm benefits from using debt financing because the higher the debt 
level the greater the firm’s value3. However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) recognized 
that, despite the tax advantage of debt, firms should not use 100 percent debt because of 
“the need to preserving flexibility” regarding its treasury management and the choice of 
                                                           
1
 Modigliani and Miller (1958): “the capital structure of a firm is a matter of indifference; and that, 
consequently, one of the core problems of corporate finance - the problem of the optimal capital structure 
for a firm - is no problem at all”. 
2
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume perfect markets in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and 
transaction costs; investors are rational and have homogeneous expectations about the investment 
opportunities of firms; absence of agency costs. 
3
 The firm's value becomes equal to its value when financed only with equity plus the present value of the 
tax benefits resulting from debt. In the extreme situation, the firm’s maximum value would occur when its 
assets are fully financed by debt, which corresponds to a tax saving maximization. 
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their sources of funding and because creditors can impose restrictions to the amount of 
financing. 
Although controversial, the theory of Modigliani and Miller gave a very 
important contribution to explain the firm value formation and the flexibility of its 
assumptions becoming crucial to the formulation of many theories of capital structure. 
Since then many capital structure studies have been produced and many models and 
theories have been proposed, looking for a better understanding of the capital structure 
foundations and overcome the theoretical assumptions subjacent to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). 
 
2.2. Tax Based Trading-Off Models of Capital Structure 
According to the trade-off theories, the firm decides its sources of funding in order to 
find a debt ratio that maximizes the tax benefits offered by debt and minimize the costs 
of bankruptcy in which the company may incur. 
Hasan (1997) illustrates it, saying that “[…]the trade-off between gains from 
leverage-induced tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs may well account for the 
traditional cost of capital curve, declining at low levels of debt but rising with 
substantial leverage and hence an optimal capital structure.” As debt increases, the 
marginal benefits decrease and marginal costs increase and vice-versa. Therefore, the 
optimal capital structure entails balancing the tax benefits of debt against the costs 
related with financial distress. 
Miller (1977) suggests that when determining the optimal capital structure, it is 
important to not simply consider corporate taxes but also add the effect of personal 
taxes. This Author argues that, considering this effect, the gain from leverage is less 
than previously believed because in a world of differential personal taxes, the marginal 
personal tax disadvantage of debt combined with supply side adjustments by firms will 
override the corporate tax advantage of debt and drive market prices to equilibrium. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) added to Miller's (1977) work the effect of 
deductible non-cash charges substitutes of interest payments on debt, such as 
accounting depreciation and investment tax credits. In their study they state that “for 
relatively low levels of leverage, the marginal value of debt is positive because there is 
a relatively high probability that additional debt can be fully utilized to reduce the 
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firm’s tax liabilities and this corporate tax reduction outweighs the higher personal 
taxes paid on additional debt. For relatively high levels of debt, the marginal value of 
debt is negative because the tax shield substitutes imply a relatively high probability 
that the potential corporate shield from additional debt will be partially or totally lost 
because of insufficient earnings, while an additional personal tax liability for holding 
debt is incurred.” Therefore, assuming that the only benefit of using debt is the tax 
saving associated to it, the use of debt is good only as long as the interest on debt can be 
deductible4. Thereby, the incremental value of interest tax shields decreases as the firm 
financial leverage increases. Consequently, as stated by Hasan (1997), a high degree of 
leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy and, therefore, increases the overall 
riskiness of the earnings stream. Moreover, the rate of interest on debt may start to rise 
and may cause the cost of capital to increase. 
Myers (2001) states that this theory supports the existence of moderate debt 
ratios and is consistent with the fact that companies with relatively safer investments 
and tangible assets tend to borrow more than firms with higher risk investments while 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest in their study that each firm has a unique interior 
optimum leverage decision, due solely to the interaction of personal and corporate tax 
treatment of debt and equity, even with the existence of positive default costs and with 
or without tax shield substitutes for debt. 
 
2.3. Agency Theory and Capital Structure Decisions 
One of the main fragilities of the neoclassical theory lies in overlooking the possibility 
of separation between ownership and management. However, in the real economy, the 
specialization of the management has been increasing. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that in more recent literature, researchers became interested not only in understanding 
how the capital structure affects the firm value but also how it affects the ownership and 
governance of the firm. 
Assuming the separation between ownership and management, owners 
(securities holders) no longer have control over the cash-flows. Although the objective 
                                                           
4
 DeAngelo and Masulis (1980): “The tax codes set a ceiling to ensure that the expected marginal 
corporate tax saving from additional debt declines as debt is added to the capital structure.” 
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of managers (agents) should be maximizing the shareholders’ return, they do not always 
run the firm with this objective, thereby originating an agency problem. As mentioned 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) “If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal.” 
The managers’ information advantage may conduct to an opportunistic 
exploitation, using the available firm free cash-flow to accomplish their personal goals. 
Thus, the agency risk becomes a critical determinant of firm’s performance. 
Based on the existence of these agency relationships, in their influential work, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that taxes are not the only condition for the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. They introduce the concept of agency costs 
and how it relates to the existence of an optimal mix of internal (retained earnings) and 
external financing (debt or equity). They identify two different types of conflicts that 
are present in every publicly-traded firm: conflict between equityholders and managers 
and conflict between debtholders and equityholders.  
The securities holders do not have control over the cash-flows, therefore in order 
to protect their rights they have to monitor the managers’ actions to ensure that their 
decisions follow the objective of increasing the firm’s value instead of wasting 
resources. The following question arises: How does one formulate the contractual 
relation between the principal and agent in order to create the right incentives for the 
manager behavior to maximize the principal’s welfare? The principal may implement 
several monitoring mechanisms, create compensation schemes or limit the resources 
available for the agent by changing the capital structure5.  
By increasing leverage while keeping the level of manager’s equity ownership 
constant, the firm mitigates the agency problem between managers and equityholders 
since managers are holding a larger stake in the firm. Increasing the level of debt also 
forces a firm to pay out cash (in the form of interest payments) and consequently 
reduces the amount of “free” cash available for managers to engage in their self-
centered activities. On the other hand, increasing the debt level may also lead to higher 
costs of debt arising from the conflict between debtholders and equityholders.  
                                                           
5
 However, as pointed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) “is generally impossible for the principal or the 
agent at zero cost (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from 
the principal’s viewpoint.” 
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According to the literature, the conflict between shareholders and debtholders can 
take two distinct forms: asset substitution and underinvestment problems. Regarding the 
asset substitution, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that once a debt is in place, the 
equityholders will have incentives to increase the risk of the firm to enhance the equity 
value at the expense of debtholders. It means that equityholders prefer a riskier project 
to a safer one because it gives them a potentially higher return while they are subject to 
the risk of losing the same amount of investment. However, this incentive to increase 
risk can be mitigated since future debt issuances will be priced taking into account this 
higher risk. The underinvestment problem arises when equityholders refuse positive 
NPV projects because they bear the full costs of the investment while having to share 
the proceeds with the debtholders. In particular, when a firm is on the edge of 
bankruptcy, the equity holders might reject to undertake positive NPV projects because 
in the event of bankruptcy the liquidation proceeds go first to the debtholders. 
 
2.4. Asymmetric Information Models of Capital Structure 
2.4.1. Pecking Order 
Myers and Majluf (1984) developed a new model, combining financing and investment 
decisions, to explain corporate finance behavior, under the assumptions that managers 
know the firm better than potential investors and the latter interpret the firm’s actions 
rationally. The model suggests explanations for the tendency to rely on internal sources 
of funds, and the preference of debt to equity if external financing is required, which 
generally means that it is better to issue safe securities than risky ones. 
Due to information asymmetry between the managers and the market, there is a 
hierarchy of funding sources. Preferably the company is financed with retained cash 
flows, then with the issuing of new debt and, only after exhausting the previous 
alternatives, with the issuing of equity. There are several reasons to explain the 
preference for internal financing. Signaling, since issuing equity may be a sign that the 
shares are overvalued and issuing debt can be a sign that the company is experiencing 
difficulties. Flexibility, given that external financing reduces the flexibility to face 
upcoming funding needs. Control, because debt contracts have covenants and new 
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shares issuing brings new shareholders to the company. Costs of new issuances, 
contrary to internal funding that have no issuance costs. 
Myers (1984) argues that “the firm may also plan to cover part of normal 
investment outlays with new borrowing, but it tries to restrain itself enough to keep the 
debt safe - that is, reasonably close to default-risk free. It restrains itself for two 
reasons: first, to avoid any material costs of financial distress; and second, to maintain 
financial slack in the form of reserve borrowing power6.” Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggest that firms whose investment opportunities outstrip operating cash flows, and 
which have used all their ability to issue low-risk debt, may forego good investments 
rather than issue risky securities to finance them. In this way, firms should carry 
sufficient financial slack to undertake good investment opportunities as they arise. 
Myers (1984) also argues that there are two conditions under which issuing 
equity might not be optimal for the firm. The first being that both managers and 
investors recognize that managers know better the exact condition of the firm and the 
future investment opportunities than the investors - asymmetric information problem. 
The second being that managers act in the best interest of the existing equityholders. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also argue that if managers have superior information 
and stock is issued to finance investment, the stock price will fall, ceteris paribus. If the 
firm issues safe (default-risk-free) debt to finance investment, the stock price will not 
fall. 
Firms may prevent these troubles by building up financial slack by restricting 
dividends, when investment requirements are modest or by issuing stock in periods 
when managers’ information advantage is small. However, as noted by Myers (1984), 
since target dividend payout ratios are sticky, and investment opportunities fluctuate 
relative to internal cash flow, the firm will, from time to time, exhaust its ability to issue 
safe debt. When this happens, the firm first turns to less risky securities - for example, 
risky debt or convertibles before common stock. 
The pecking order theory indicates that when firms make capital structure 
decisions they do not have a target leverage ratio. Leverage will adjust in accordance 
with the need to obtain external financing and not because of trying to reach an optimal 
                                                           
6
 Myers (1984): “‘Reserve borrowing power’ means that it can issue safe debt if it needs to.” 
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capital structure. It contrasts with a static trade-off framework in which the firm is 
viewed as setting a target debt-to-value ratio and gradually moving towards it. 
 
2.4.2. Signaling 
If we assume that market prices do not reflect all the information, especially that is not 
publicly available, then capital structure decisions could be used as a signaling 
mechanism. Modigliani and Miller irrelevance proposition implicitly assumes that 
investors know the random return stream of the firm and they value the firm 
accordingly. This is the basis for signaling approaches of optimal capital structure. The 
market values the firm according to its perceived stream of returns, thus changes in the 
capital structure of such a firm may alter that market perception. Changing the capital 
structure can influence the value of the firm since it leads to changes in the market 
perceived firm’s risk class although the actual risk class in fact remains unchanged. 
Building on this, Ross (1977) proposes the signaling approach to explain the 
changes in capital structure. He argues that managers who are better informed than the 
investors about the firm’s expected cash flows may change the capital structure to send 
out clear signals to the market about the future performance of the firm, if they have the 
appropriate incentive to do so. However, without incentive schedules to truthful 
signaling, incentive signaling equilibrium does not exist.  
One empirical implication of the Ross’s (1977) incentive-signaling theory is that 
in a cross-section the values of firms will rise with leverage since increasing leverage 
increases the market’s perception of value and, in equilibrium, firms are correctly 
distinguished by their financial choices.7 
Leland and Pyle (1977) developed a model of capital structure based in the 
informational asymmetries, in which it is assumed that owners (the insiders) are better 
informed about firm’s projects than the investors (the outsiders). The greater the 
owner’s willingness to invest in his own projects or company, the more positive signal 
                                                           
7
 Ross (1977): “Despite these somewhat paradoxical results, a great deal of care must be taken in actual 
empirical testing. […] In a continuous time model it is certainly the case that for a given firm, with true 
bankruptcy costs, value will fall with increases in the debt-equity ratio; in fact D/E must approach infinity 
as bankruptcy is approached (in a diffusion model). Even without such costs, D/E and V will move in 
opposite directions. These effects will tend to counter the initial incentive-signaling effects and may make 
empirical testing more difficult.” 
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the firm is sending out to investors. It can serve as a signal of project quality and the 
value of the firm is expected to increase.8 
About this signaling model, Hasan (1997) underlines two implications. “[A first 
is that] if the original owners of a company going public decide to keep a large fraction 
of the stock, then these firms should experience greater price earnings multiples 
(Copeland and Weston, 1988). Thus, in contrast with MM (1958), even in the absence of 
taxes, the financial structure of the firm will be related to project or firm value. A 
second implication is that if the firm’s value is positively related to the fraction of the 
owners’ wealth held as equity in the firm, then the firm will have greater debt capacity 
and will use a greater amount of debt. Hence, although debt is not a signal in this 
model, its use will be positively correlated to the firm’s value.” 
This financing equilibrium proposed by signaling models diverges from models 
which ignore asymmetric information. In contrast with Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
the financial structure is related to the firm value even in absence of taxation and firms 
with riskier returns will have lower leverage ratios even without bankruptcy costs. 
Furthermore, Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that financial intermediation, which is 
difficult to explain in classical models of financial equilibrium, can be seen as a natural 
response to the asymmetric information. 
 
2.4.3. Market Timing 
In addition to the theoretical models we presented so far, which have been subject to 
major theoretical and empirical research, other approaches have emerged in an attempt 
to explain the capital structure decisions. Among them, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
introduce a new approach, supported in the empirical evidence that market timing is an 
important determinant of real financing decisions. They suggest that firms issue equity 
when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and 
repurchase equity when their market values are low. They also find that low-leverage 
                                                           
8
 Leland and Pyle (1977): “[…] information on project quality may be transferred if the actions of 
entrepreneurs ("which speak louder than words") can be observed. One such action, observable because 
of disclosure rules, is the willingness of the person(s) with inside information to invest in the project or 
firm. This willingness to invest may serve as a signal to the lending market of the true quality of the 
project; lenders will place a value on the project that reflects the information transferred by the signal.” 
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firms tend to raise funds issuing more equity when their valuations are high and, 
conversely, high-leveraged firms tend to raise funds issuing more debt when their 
valuations are low. Hence, they consider that the observed capital structure is the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the market. Like in the pecking order, also 
in the market timing theory there is no optimal leverage ratio. 
Frank and Goyal (2004) suggest that the basic idea behind this theory is the 
following: “managers look at current conditions in both debt markets and equity 
markets. If they need financing, then they will use whichever market looks more 
favorable currently. If neither market looks favorable, then fund raising may be 
deferred. Alternatively, if current conditions look unusually favorable, then funds may 
be raised even if they are not currently required.”  
Alti (2006) said that despite the fact that market timing is important to explain 
changes in capital structure in the short-run, it has limited explanatory power in the 
long-run. He suggests that the long-run capital structure policies of a firm appear to be 
largely consistent with the existence of leverage targets, in accordance with trade-off 
model. 
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Chapter 3 – Capital Structure of the Banks: Overview of the 
Literature 
 
3.1. Market (In)Eficiency and Banks’ Role 
As a firm, banks dovetail with the same capital theory of non-financial firms. However, 
as financial intermediaries, banks are a specific industry with a particular function and 
special features that should be incorporated in their capital structure analyses. 
Moreover, banks develop their activity under a regulatory and supervisory framework 
that establishes mandatory capital levels. 
Banks, as important payers in the financial system, have the primary function of 
facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic resources, both spatially and 
temporally, in an uncertain environment (Merton, 1995).9 Under the traditional view of 
financial intermediation, banks are in competition with markets to offer an increasing 
range of financial products and, thus, in many aspects they are substitutes. The 
increasing market globalization and continuous improvement of technologies led to an 
increasing sophistication of financial products and a reduction of transaction costs. This 
tendency adds to competition between financial intermediaries and financial markets 
and, hence, contributes to the market efficiency. 
According to this traditional view, in perfect capital markets characterized by the 
inexistence of frictions, transaction and informational costs, no benefits would emerge 
from the existence of financial intermediaries. In contrast, market imperfections 
underlie the existence and rationality of the financial intermediaries. Banks would 
contribute to solve or mitigate some of these imperfections. 
Merton (1995) introduces a new conceptual framework to analyze the dynamics 
of financial intermediation. According to his dynamic perspective, intermediaries are 
better suited to handle highly customized and low volume products whereas financial 
markets tend to be a more efficient alternative to financial institutions when products 
are standardized, traded in large volumes, serving a large number of investors who are 
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 “Under the traditional theory of financial intermediation, a banking firm is portrayed as an asset 
transformer (see, e.g., Gurley and Shaw 1960), which pools resources in an attempt to match / 
intermediate economic agents’ profiles of consumption and investment. Under this approach, the banking 
firm’s most prominent function is to intermediate between savers and borrowers” (Santos, 2003) 
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comfortable to evaluate their prices. According to this view, further to their resources’ 
allocation function, banks also play an important role in the financial innovation 
process, creating and testing new products constantly and, hence, contributing to 
increase the market efficiency. 10 
As per this Merton’s (1995) new dynamic perspective of complementarities and 
interactions, it no longer makes sense to say that financial institutions and markets 
compete amongst themselves but say that the two are just as surely complementary 
institutions, each reinforcing and improving the other in the performance of their 
functions. 
There is some literature arguing that the main driver behind this financial 
innovation is the attempt to reduce the constraints of regulation, including taxes 
accounting rules and transaction costs, thus contributing to market efficiency11. 
However, during the present global financial crisis, a large number of economists have 
come to argue that financial innovation played an important role in causing the financial 
crisis due to an excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. This moral hazard 
behavior is largely motivated by the government safety net and the prospect of bailouts 
for banks12 
Among academics is widely accepted that innovation in finance contributes to 
market efficiency, but only the innovation which makes the securities more flexible and 
                                                           
10
 See Merton (1995) for more detail on the role and institutional dynamics of the financial 
intermediation, under a functional perspective. 
11
 e.g. Finnerty (2008): “Securities innovation improves capital market efficiency by offering more cost-
effective means of transferring risks, increasing liquidity, and reducing transaction costs and agency 
costs. It is a profit-driven response to changes in the economic, tax, and regulatory environment.” 
12
 There is no consensus about the implications of financial innovation, for instance while Sánchez (2010) 
argues “My central point is that although financial innovation has lately fallen out of favor because some 
of its products acted as vehicles in the credit boom that led to the crisis, criticism should be taken with 
caution. Innovation has been with us for a long time, and its overall contribution to finance and welfare 
has been positive. Provided that we strengthen prudential regulation to discourage excessive risk taking 
in the future, innovation can continue to benefit our societies.”; Park (2009) argues “The current crisis is 
primarily the direct result of the abuse of some of the latest and most innovative financial techniques. 
Most of which are too esoteric and technical to be comprehended correctly by both government 
regulators and academic economists. Many crises are usually a byproduct of the cycle of financial 
innovations.”; and Pearson and Henderson (2011) point out “Our findings are, however, consistent with 
the recent hypothesis that issuing firms might shroud some aspects of innovative securities or introduce 
complexity to exploit uninformed investors.” 
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less costly, hence, accessible for a larger number of people, allows improving the risk 
management and contributes to the transparency and better functioning of the markets.13 
Comparing to other industries, another major peculiarity of banks is the fact that 
customers are simultaneously debtholders because banks raise most of their funds in the 
form of deposits. This also makes banks have a distinctive capital structure, since 
deposits are a component of debt. An additional feature that distinguishes banks from 
non-financial firms is their comparative higher default risk sensibility, since their 
performance is highly determined by the client’s liabilities probability of default.14  
 
3.2. Tax Advantages of Debt and Bankruptcy Costs 
Santos (2003) point out that, similarly to non-financial firms, “in the banking industry 
and under many tax regimes, the deductibility of borrowing costs for income taxes 
purposes also represents an element of the tax advantage of debt financing over equity 
(e.g., Osterberg and Thompson 1996; and Marcus 1983).” However, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, Miller (1977) considers that, by adding the effect of personal 
taxes, this tax shield effect is partly offset. Besides the tax advantages of debt, in the 
same fashion as non-financial firms, banks have other tax deductible substitutes of debt 
as tax shields, e.g. depreciation of fixed assets, goodwill and provisions for loan losses. 
Osterberg (1990) presents a model where, in the absence of capital regulation, 
income tax and bankruptcy costs are relevant for a particular bank to decide its leverage 
ratio. When Osterberg (1990) accounts for capital regulation, it becomes clear that the 
impact of such regulation depends on market forces (market factors considered in his 
model are tax rates, nondebt tax shields and municipal securities). This means that 
market forces and regulatory influences on banks' capital structure are interconnected. 
                                                           
13
 “Financial innovation does have a dark side; it can have detrimental effects. There is evidence that 
financial innovations are sometimes undertaken to create complexity and exploit the purchaser. As far as 
the financial crisis that started in 2007 is concerned, securitisation and subprime mortgages may have 
exacerbated the problem. [...] There are also many financial innovations that have had a significant 
positive effect. These include venture capital and leveraged buyout funds to finance businesses. In 
addition, financial innovation has allowed many improvements in the environment and in global health. 
On balance it seems likely its effects have been positive rather than negative.” (Franklin Allen. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2012, 493–514) 
14
 “Thus, risk management is almost always an activity of first order importance to the efficient operation 
of an intermediary but, in general, need not be so for business firms.” (Merton, 1995) 
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Scholes et al. (1990) developed a model15 that predicts a relationship between banks' 
marginal tax rates and their investment and financing strategy. This evidence supports 
the existence of tax clienteles in the sample of U.S. Banks used in their empirical tests.16 
Nevertheless, they also document that banks seemingly consider nontax costs in their 
tax planning, for instance, the regulatory capital penalties. 
Scholes et al. (1990) state that “the evidence suggests that banks are more 
inclined to take actions that reduce taxes when the costs of doing so, in terms of the 
effects on income reported to shareholders and regulators are relatively small and the 
magnitude of the potential tax benefits is large.”  Their findings also suggest that when 
regulatory capital falls to close the minimum required or bellow it, banks are more 
willing to forgo tax benefits by selling appreciated securities or defer the sale of losers 
to improve their regulatory capital positions, by increasing earnings. In these 
circumstances, may be keen to use both the accounting standards and fiscal law 
available means in order to improve the earnings, even paying more taxes, to increase 
the capital book value and consequently, the regulatory capital. In contrast, as 
regulatory capital increases, banks can better afford to accelerate the sale of losers or 
defer the sale of appreciated securities to save on taxes. 
Admitting absence of supervision and regulation, increasing the financial 
leverage led to an increment of financial distress and bankruptcy risk. Are these risks 
different from non-financial firms? Santos (2003) suggest three major reasons to explain 
why banking firms are likely to face lower expected bankruptcy costs than non-financial 
firms, for the same level of financial leverage. “The first factor is related to the 
effectiveness of bankruptcy administrative proceedings, the second factor is related to 
the governmental safety net regime, and the third effect is related to the so-called to-
big-to-fall doctrine.” Relating to the first, some authors argue that the losses for 
creditors resulting from a bank’s bankruptcy process are smaller than those from non-
financial firms, because the insolvency process of banks is handled more efficiently. 
Regarding the second, the safety net includes a combination of measures and rules 
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 They test a model where banks trade-off the tax advantages of realizing securities losses against the 
costs of reporting reduced regulatory capital and financial income. 
16
 “We find that banks with net operating losses take fewer long positions in tax favored assets (municipal 
bonds and direct lease assets) and more short positions in tax-favored assets (preferred stock and 
common stock) than do tax-paying banks.” (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1990) 
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emerged from public authorities, regulators and other market players, aiming to ensure 
the stability and soundness of the banking system and protect the bank customers. The 
third argument, to-big-to-fall, is based on the widely negative impact of a bank failure 
in the economy as a whole. Thus, according to this, the probability of a big bank going 
into bankruptcy is lower than the probability of failure of a non-financial firm in the 
same circumstances. Therefore, large banks might take more risks than they would, 
increasing the probability of bankruptcy. 
The results of the survey conducted by Marques and Santos (2003)17 shows 
moderate support for the trade-off theory. With regard to this theory, they argue that “it 
is manifestly clear that it cannot resolve the central problem of identifying and 
measuring these costs and benefits, thus leaving undetermined the economic framework 
that could explain the capital structure conundrum.” 
In contrast, we can find a number of authors that present arguments in support of 
the hypothesis that the problem of the banking firm’s capital structure choice can be 
approached and explained, similar to non-financial firms, trading-off the benefits of 
debt in terms of tax shield against the increase of the costs of bankruptcy. 
 
3.3. Agency Problems and Bank’s Capital Structure Decisions 
In both non-financial and financial firms we can find conflicts of interest among the 
different stakeholders18. As noted earlier in chapter 2, in non-financial firms the most 
prominent conflicts, and also the most present in the literature, arise among 
shareholders, managers and debtholders. In the banking sector, other stakeholders 
assume the same relevance as the previous, due to the idiosyncrasies of this industry. 
They are the regulators, the depositors and the tax payers. The existence of these agency 
problems may influence the decisions about the bank’s capital structure. 
Regarding the conflicts between shareholders and managers in banking, Santos 
(2003) argues that “are of the same nature as the ones emerging in a non-banking firm.” 
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 Marques and Santos (2003) conducted a survey to a sample of 89.5 percent of the Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of Portuguese banks in office during the period of 1989-1998. 
18
 Those individuals and/or organizations that have interest or concern in a certain firm and, thus can 
affect or be affected by the firm's actions, objectives and policies. In addition to the most studied in the 
corporate finance literature (debtholders, shareholders and managers) we can enumerate others such as 
employees, public entities (e.g. government and its agencies), clients, suppliers, community, etc. 
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Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue that regulatory capital may not have the desirable 
effect in promoting bank safety if the agency problem between insiders and outside 
investors has economic significance because issuing equity may dilute the ownership of 
bank insiders sufficiently to reduce their incentives to expend effort on behalf of the 
bank’s stockholders. The results of the Marques and Santos (2003) survey indicate that 
the “managers appear to be primarily concerned with the influence of the incentives 
associated with the governance arrangements and the control rights allocation 
determined by capital structure decision-making”, which is consistent with the 
relevance of the agency relationships in the capital structure decision making in banking 
firms. 
One of the idiosyncrasies of banks is their liabilities structure since they are, to a 
large extent, held by small depositors and other financial institutions. Concerning the 
small depositors, due to both insignificant portion each one holds on the firm’s total 
debt and their lack of skills, they are unable or unwilling to assess the banks riskiness, 
creating a free-riding problem. As we know, in the absence of such monitoring, 
managers’ decisions might result in moral hazard. For this reason small depositors need 
any public or private authority acting on their behalf (agent) to mitigate the costs arising 
from the conflict of interests between bank owners and them. On the other hand, once 
the public authorities’ safety net mechanisms19 protect the depositors’ wealth against the 
consequences of risk taking by the banking firm, the incentive of depositors to monitor 
and control the banks performance are sorely reduced. Moreover, the existence of this 
government guarantee creates a moral hazard problem in the form of an incentive for 
excessive risk-taking by banks, while depositors have little or no incentive to monitor 
them. 
When the depositors’ protection against opportunistic risk-taking by banks is 
achieved by a fixed-premium deposit insurance regime, insensitively to asset risk, 
banks’ owners have an additional incentive to leveraging-up and invest in riskier assets. 
Thus, shareholders instead of using their own financing or resorting to risk sensitive 
debt-financing to fund incremental asset growth, are very likely to resort to deposit 
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 The safety net mechanism can take different forms and provides a cushion that protects lenders against 
bank’s economic losses. Among the different mechanisms included in the safety net, deposit insurance is 
one of the most used. However, such protection limits the incentive to control risk taking, creating a 
moral hazard problem. 
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financing because it is advantageous due to the subsidy granted by public deposit 
insurers at taxpayers’ expense. Such decision reduces the capital ratio and further 
increases the probability of potentially disruptive and costly insolvency. (Santos, 2003) 
Gropp and Heider (2009) find some evidence that higher deposit insurance 
coverage is associated with higher market leverage, which is consistent with an effect of 
regulation on capital structure. However, this effect disappears once they control for 
bank characteristics. Thus, their study fails to find evidence that deposit insurance 
coverage has impact on banks’ capital structure. 
Depositors who do not benefit from the deposit insurance protection can mitigate 
the agency cost assessing the risk level of such a bank and withdraw their deposits if 
they perceive that the bank insiders’ decisions are increasing the probability of failure 
and, therefore, their money is at risk. Thus, in the absence of deposit insurance the 
agency problem between shareholders and depositors becomes the typical agency 
problem between shareholders and creditors. Due to their limitations, the most common 
reaction of small depositors to a bank’s risk increasing, and perhaps the only one, is 
withdrawing their deposits, which usually happens as a result of a market or public 
authority notice that the bank is experiencing difficulties and not as a result of their own 
assessment. 
Santos (2003) argues that governmental intervention in deposit markets “[…] 
grants banks’ owners a ‘free’ put option on the assets of the bank, enabling them to 
honor deposit obligations under all circumstances and ‘transforming’ deposits into risk 
free assets.” Concerning the agency conflict between bank shareholders and regulators, 
it arises once regulators should act in behalf and best interests of depositors. To 
overcome the agency conflict between bank owners and regulators, the latter set a 
regulatory framework such as minimum capital requirements and implement 
supervisory activities, which intended to control bank owners’ incentives to undertake 
moral hazard decisions.  
Also the agency relationship between taxpayers and regulators, such as 
government and central bank, is a source of agency risk, once taxpayers expect the 
public entities and regulators to act in their interest. But, at the same time, they are 
dispersed and do not have the incentives and the tools to monitor the public entities 
intervention.  
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3.4. Regulation on Banking 
Capital structure of banking firms is somewhat non-discretionary, since they have 
regulatory capital requirements. According to the literature, the main foundations for 
banking regulation are the market inefficiencies (asymmetric information, adverse 
selection and moral hazard), the inability of depositors to monitor banks (mostly 
explained by the associated costs and the free riding problem) and the risk of a systemic 
failure (banks receive deposits and have a monetary function, which exposes them to 
runs that can be transmitted to the entire financial system). 
The supporters of banking regulation use the classical argument that financial 
markets (in particular banks) must be strongly regulated to mitigate the risk of a 
systemic financial crisis20, due to the important role they play in the economy (Santos, 
2001). However, due to the lack of consensus on the nature of the market failure, there 
is still no consensus on whether banks need to be regulated and, if so, how they should 
be regulated (Santos, 2001). More recently, if the current EU sovereign debt crisis, with 
global impact, strengthens the idea that bank regulation and supervision are needed, also 
evidences the failure of the objective of stability in the financial system. 
In the literature, the two most prominent aspects of banking regulation are the 
regulatory capital and the deposit insurance. Consistent with the objective of the 
dissertation, this section only focus in the first aspect and try to understand how it can 
influence the banking capital structure decisions. According to the regulatory view, it is 
believed that if the banks’ capital is at an appropriate level and large enough to absorb 
losses in case of severe events, it can avoid major failures in the financial system. 
Though, based on their empirical results, Gropp and Heider (2009) suggest that capital 
regulation and capital buffers may not be of first-order importance in determining the 
capital structure of most banks. 
The Basel accords are the most visible outcome of a continuous effort to 
improve the banking regulatory framework and incorporate, albeit slowly, some of the 
suggestions produced by the literature in this field. The successive accords are the most 
relevant contributions for the general use of capital ratios as an instrument of banking 
regulation and for its convergence worldwide. Therefore, in what respects capital 
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 See Santos (2001) section 3.1 for a resume of the literature proposals to prevent systemic failure. 
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structure involuntary decisions in banking is essential, nevertheless some conceptual 
shortcomings and ineffectiveness, take a trip through the Basel Accords. 
 
3.4.1. Basel Accords 
Basel I 
The international convergence of bank capital regulation started with the 1988 Basel I 
Capital Accord that intended to state a minimum level of capital for banks with relevant 
international business, to ensure the capital adequacy in relation to the counterparty 
credit risk21. Basel I set out the target standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets at 
8% (of which the tier 1 capital element will be at least 4%), which banks would be 
expected to accomplish by the end of 1992. The bank’s capital is then related to 
different categories of assets or off-balance-sheet exposure, which are risk-adjusted 
according to broad categories of relative risk22 in order to assess the banks’ capital 
adequacy. About this accord, Santos (2001) refers that “its conceptual limitations 
together with financial innovation have created incentives and opportunities for 
regulatory capital arbitrage, and have consequently led to a reduction in its 
effectiveness”, which emphasized the need to redesign this regulatory framework and 
gave space to the emergence of new research and contributions on this field. 
The first amendment took place in 1996 and aims to amend the 1988 Capital 
Accord, which considered solely the risk of counterparty failure, to accounts and set 
capital requirements for market risks23 and also defined a Tier 3 capital to cover these 
risks. 
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 The counterparty credit risk is defined as the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default 
before the final settlement of the transaction’s cash flows. An economic loss would occur if the 
transactions or the portfolio of transactions with the counterparty have a positive economic value at the 
time of default. 
22
 The set of risk weights available to classify the assets is 0%, 10%, 20%, 50 and 100%. 
23
 Market risk is defined by the Basel Committee as “the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet 
positions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are: the risks 
pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book; foreign exchange risk and 
commodities risk throughout the bank.” 
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Basel II 
Later, in June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision presented the Basel 
II accord, which sets more risk-sensitive capital requirements because is more aware of 
particular features of the supervisory and accounting systems, as well as the different 
risk profiles of the banks. This new approach builds on two main ideas: banks are better 
informed about its risks than the regulators and the capital charges must be more 
correlated with the credit risk of bank’s assets (risk sensitive). Basel II lays on the 
following three pillars approach: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
and market discipline. The First Pillar adjusts the total minimum capital requirements 
calculation to cover credit, market and operational risks. Despite the great changes in 
the calculation basis, the target capital ratios remain unchanged (target standard ratio of 
capital to weighted risk assets at 8%; tier 1 capital ratio at 4%). The total risk-weighted 
assets is obtained multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and operational 
risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%) and adding the sum 
of risk-weighted assets for credit risk. 
This new accord consents banks to choose between two broad methodologies for 
calculating their capital requirements for credit risk: the standardized approach which is 
largely supported on ratings published by external credit assessment institutions 
recognized for this purpose and came to replace the existing risk-weighting bucket 
scheme and the internal ratings-based approach, which allows banks to use their internal 
rating systems for credit risk. 
Undoubtedly, Basel II is intended to create a set of incentives to award the best 
practices of banks in terms of risk assessment and management. The Basel Committee 
believed that such objective could be achieved by combining the risk sensitive capital 
requirements of the pillar 1 with the efforts by banks to assess their capital adequacy 
and by supervisors to review such assessments, supported by pillar 2, and the market 
discipline required under the pillar 3. 
In 2005, the Basel Committee started working in the enhancement of the Basel II 
market risk framework. This work, influenced by the financial crisis that began in the 
middle of 2007, culminates with the publication of the Basel 2.5 Accord, in 2009, and 
results in a greater capital charge against the market risks that banks run in their trading 
operations. 
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During the financial crisis, the losses verified in most of the banks’ trading 
books were much higher than the capital charges to cover market risks fixed by Pillar 1 
and it became an important source of losses and leverage increase. The main objective 
of Basel 2.5 is to encourage banks to derisk and deleverage the trading book activities 
by introducing both a stressed value-at-risk (SVaR) which adds to the Basel II VaR 
capital requirement and an incremental risk charge (IRC). Banks were expected to 
comply with Basel 2.5 by no later than 31 December 2011. 
 
Basel III 
More recently, in 2011 the Basel Committee introduced the Basel III, aiming to 
strengthen global capital (capital ratios calibration, in order to increase both the quality 
and quantity of the regulatory capital base) and liquidity rules with the goal of 
promoting a more resilient banking sector. The Basel Committee (2011) argued that 
“One of the main reasons of the economic and financial crisis, which began in 2007, 
became so severe was that the banking sectors of many countries had built up excessive 
on and off-balance sheet leverage. This was accompanied by a gradual erosion of the 
level and quality of the capital base.” Hence, innovative hybrid capital instruments 
currently allowed in Tier 1 capital base, although limited to 15%, will be ruled out, Tier 
2 capital instruments will be harmonized and Tier 3 capital instruments will be 
removed. In complement to capital ratios, a leverage ratio requirement will be 
introduced to drive down the leverage and enhance the risk-based measures with a 
straightforward and independent measure of risk. 
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Chapter 4 – European Banks: Empirical Study 
 
4.1. Objectives 
The purpose of this empirical study is to identify the main capital structure determinants 
of the European Union listed banks. Do the standard capital structure factors apply to 
banks? Or instead, are the regulatory capital and capital buffers the main factors 
considered by banks in their capital structure choice? The answer to these questions 
shed some light on the relative prominence of the capital structure voluntary and/or 
involuntary decisions of banks. 
The methodology followed is similar to Gropp and Heider (2009), who suggest 
that standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to 
large U.S. and European banks, from 1991 to 2004, except for banks whose capital ratio 
is close to the regulatory minimum. Their results also show that mispriced deposit 
insurance and capital regulation were of second order importance in determining the 
capital structure of these banking firms.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we describe the sample and present 
the descriptive statistics in the sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. We examine the 
components of bank capital structure in Section 4.4. Then, methodology is delineated 
and predictions about the relationship between variables are given, in section 4.5. 
Section 4.6 presents and discusses the results.  
 
4.2. Data sources and Sample Description  
The data used in this empirical study comes from the following sources: 
a) A sample of listed banks from the EU27 was initially collected from the 
Bankscope of the Bureau Van Dijk. The sample only includes banks which are 
classified as commercial banks and bank-holding companies according to the 
Bankscope. All the financial statements data are from this database; 
b) All market data which comprise banks’ stock prices, number of shares 
outstanding and dividends were obtained from Thompson Financial’s 
Datastream. 
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The analysis period starts in 1998 and ends in 2011, according to the data 
available in the Bankscope. The sample comprises 145 banks24, from 25 countries25, and 
has 1,452 bank-year observations. 
Here, we face at least two potential sources of bias. Firstly, we use an 
unbalanced panel of banks due to the missing data. While some studies (e.g. Frank and 
Goyal, 2004) use the multiple imputation method26 to predict the data that has not been 
recorded, we assume that the lack of data for some bank-year is purely random and 
therefore does not result in a biased sample. Secondly, the survivorship bias27, since the 
Bankscope includes only data on banks that continue to exist at the last release of the 
database. The Table 1 shows the details of the sample for each EU27 country. 
In their empirical study, Gropp and Heider (2009) decided on 2004 as the end 
point in order to avoid the confounding effects of i) banks anticipating the 
implementation of the Basle II regulatory framework and ii) banks extensive use of off-
balance sheet activities in the run-up of the subprime bubble leading to the 2007-09 
financial crisis. We also share this concern and will analyze two distinct periods, 1998-
2004 and 2005-2011, to isolate the effects of the Basel II and the recent financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, we will also report the results for the entire sample (1998-2011). 
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 The initial sample collected from Bankscope consisted of 163 Banks, but not all could be included due 
to lack of data. 
25
 Estonia and Latvia have no banks in the sample. 
26
 “The idea of multiple imputation is to use the facts that you can observe about a firm in a given year to 
predict the data that has not been recorded.” (Frank and Goyal, 2004) 
27
 “This leads to the well known problem of survivorship bias. Early studies such as Titman and Wessels 
(1988) examined balanced panels of data. Only firms that existed over the full time period were included. 
In recent years this practice has been replaced by the now common use of unbalanced panels of firms. We 
use unbalanced panel methods.” (Frank and Goyal, 2004) 
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Table 1 - Number of unique banks and bank-year observations across countries 
The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, 
from 1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. 
 
 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Frank and Goyal (2004) pointed out that the older academic literature tends to focus on 
book debt ratios, while more recent academic literature tends to focus on market debt 
ratios. In this investigation we use both market and book leverage ratios and, in both 
cases, we consider not only the long term debt but instead the total debt. When equity is 
measured at book value, it’s called book leverage and when measured at market value 
Country
Number of 
unique banks
Number of 
bank-year 
observations
AUSTRIA 5 62
BELGIUM 4 26
BULGARIA 3 13
CYPRUS 2 14
CZECH REPUBLIC 1 13
DENMARK 28 311
FINLAND 3 13
FRANCE 9 101
GERMANY 10 89
GREECE 7 59
HUNGARY 1 14
IRELAND 2 27
ITALY 16 175
LITHUANIA 2 15
LUXEMBOURG 3 27
MALTA 2 11
NETHERLANDS 5 36
POLAND 12 126
PORTUGAL 3 42
ROMANIA 3 21
SLOVAKIA 4 32
SLOVENIA 2 7
SPAIN 6 74
SWEDEN 3 38
UNITED KINGDOM 9 106
TOTAL 145 1,452
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it’s called market leverage.28 In both cases debt (or more precisely liabilities) is 
measured at book value. 
In Table 2 we describe in detail how we construct the variables. In appendix 1 
we provide additional information, namely, the fields collected from each data source to 
construct these variables.  
 
Table 2 - Variables definition 
 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables. Following the initial 
orientation proposed for this study, we find valuable to compare the descriptive 
statistics with those of Gropp and Heider (2009, Table II), obtained for a sample of the 
largest 200 publicly traded banks in the US and UE and with those of Frank and Goyal 
(2004, Table 3), obtained for a typical sample of listed non-financial firms. 
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 Rajan and Zingales (1995): “Given the observed differences in the composition of liabilities, before 
undertaking any investigation of leverage it is appropriate to define what we mean by this term.” 
Variables Definition
Book Leverage Ratio 1- (book value of equity / book value of assets)
Market Leverage Ratio
1- (market value of equity (=number of shares * end of year 
stock price) / market value of bank (=market value of equity + 
book value of liabilities))
Total Book Value Liabilities = Total Assets - Equity
Size Total book value of assets
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value of assets / Book value of assets
Market value of assets = Market value of bank
Profits EBIT / book value of assets
EBIT = (pre-tax profit + interest expenses)
Collateral
(Total securities + Cash and due from + Other tangible assets) 
/ Book value of assets
Dividend dummy 1 if the bank pays a dividend in a given year, 0 otherwise
Asset risk
Annualised standard deviation of daily stock price returns * 
(market value of equity / market value of bank)
Deposits (Book) Total deposits / Book value of assets
Non-deposit liabilities (Book) Book leverage – Deposits (Book)
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Several variables have mean values that quite diverge from the median, which 
indicates that there is a large cross-sectional diversity. Despite having selected only the 
listed banks, the sample displays substantial heterogeneity since the largest bank in the 
sample has total assets of €2.6 trillion while the smallest has only total assets in the 
amount of €42 million. Total book assets mean (median) is equal to €133,460 million 
(€8,592 million). In Gropp and Heider (2009), the total book assets mean (median) is 
€64,100 million (€14,900 million), which means that although their sample is also 
heterogeneous, is not so much as ours. For both, banks and non-financial firms the 
median market-to-book ratio is close to one, although the non-financial firms exhibit an 
higher mean market-to-book ratio. The median profitability of our sample of banks is 
3.6% of assets, which is a little less than the 4.9% of  the largest 200 listed banks in the 
US and UE and about one third  of non-financial firms profitability (12%). Banks hold 
much less collateral29 than non-financial firms, respectively, an average of 28.4% of the 
book assets (27% in Gropp and Heider (2009)) versus an average of 56%. Around 81% 
of listed banks from EU27 pay dividends (94% in Gropp and Heider (2009), while only 
43% of non-financial firms do so. Regarding the assets risk, Gropp and Heider (2009) 
pointed that “the assets of firms are typically three times as volatile as the assets of 
banks (12% versus 3.6%)” and our sample also supports that evidence (4.7%). 
Analyzing these descriptive statistics, banks seem to be less profitable and less 
risky when compared to non-financial firms. This matches the earlier finding by Gropp 
and Heider (2009). Nevertheless, looking at the banks’ leverage, it shows that the 
banking industry is more leveraged than non-financial firms. Median book leverage is 
92.5% and median market leverage is 90.5% and in Gropp and Heider (2009) are 
respectively 92.6% and 87.3%, while in Frank and Goyal (2004), non-financial firms 
exhibit a median book leverage of 24% and a median market leverage of 23%.  
In Appendix 2 we present the correlations among the variables. Bank size is 
inversely correlated with profit and positively correlated with leverage which seems to 
indicate that larger banks tend to have lower profits and more leverage. Banks with 
more profits have also less leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that, in all 
countries except in Germany, size is positively correlated with leverage and profitability 
                                                           
29
 Our definition of collateral for banks includes liquid securities that can be used as collateral when 
borrowing from central banks and is similar to that used by Gropp and Heider (2009). 
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is negatively correlated with leverage. Bank’s market-to-book ratio correlates positively 
with asset risk and profits and negatively with leverage. 
Banks with more asset risk have less leverage, since these two factors are 
strongly and negatively correlated. All these correlations match those obtained by 
Gropp and Heider (2009) and those typically found for non-financial firms, including in 
Frank and Goyal (2004) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
In contrast to the typically expected for non-financial firms and particularly to 
what is presented by Frank and Goyal (2004), bank’s collateral and leverage are 
negatively correlated, which is consistent with Gropp and Heider (2009). Also Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) assert that “tangibility is always positively correlated with leverage 
in all countries (both for the book leverage and market leverage regressions)”. 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. Total book 
assets are in millions of euros. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the 
total tangible assets as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays dividends, 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the annualised unlevered 
standard deviation of daily stock return. Book leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus book value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Market leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus market value of equity 
divided by market value of assets. Deposits (book) are the total deposits as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Non-deposits liabilities (book) is the book leverage ratio minus deposits (book). See 
Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
 
 
Frank and 
Goyal (2004, 
Table 3)
Median Standard 
desviation
Median
Total book assets 133,460 8,592 332,847 2,586,701 42 14,900 126,000 -
Market-to-Book ratio 1.053 1.019 0.165 3.064 0.548 1.039 0.105 0.980
Profits 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.406 -0.436 0.049 0.019 0.120
Collateral 0.284 0.257 0.159 1.082 0.006 0.260 0.130 0.560
Dividend payer 0.814 1.000 0.389 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.231 0.000
Asset Risk 0.047 0.025 0.074 1.272 0.000 0.028 0.034 0.120
Book leverage ratio 0.895 0.925 0.111 1.045 0.046 0.927 0.029 0.240
Market leverage ratio 0.865 0.905 0.139 0.999 0.062 0.888 0.083 0.230
Deposits (book) 0.684 0.750 0.189 1.001 0.000 0.706 0.153 -
Non-deposits liabilities (book) 0.211 0.160 0.173 0.874 0.004 0.218 0.156 -
Gropp and Heider
(2009, Table II)
 Mean
 Median Standard desviation  Maximum  Minimum
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4.4. Financial Structure of Banks 
Capital structure of banks differs from the one of non-financial firms, essentially, 
because it includes deposits, a source of funding not available to non-financial firms. 
Looking at the balance statement of a bank, the assets are financing by equity and 
liabilities, and the latter are decomposed into deposits and non-deposits liabilities. 
Graph 1 presents the evolution of the financial structure of the UE27 listed 
banks, over time. The ratio of equity to total assets increased from 9.29% in 1998 to 
11% in 2010, and decreased to 9.44% in 2011. At the end of 2004, the ratio of equity to 
total assets was 10.58%. Therefore, it is not in the period in which both Basel II 
implementation and financial crisis take place that the equity increase is more notable. 
The ratio of deposits to total asset decreases from 78.33% in 1998 to 64.73% in 
2010, and increase to 66.05% in 2011. In 2006, before the beginning of the financial 
crisis, deposits represented 65.72% of banks total financial resources. Thus, during our 
sample period banks have substituted deposits for non-deposits liabilities, which is not 
consistent with the role of the banking regulation as a driver of deposits. Gropp and 
Heider (2009) pointed out that “the shift away from deposits towards non-deposit 
liabilities as a source of financing further supports a much reduced role of regulation 
as a determinant of banks’ capital structure.” 
Graph 1 - Banks book financial structure over time 
Total deposits are the total deposits as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Non-deposit liabilities are the book leverage 
ratio minus Total deposits. Equity is equal to 1 minus Total deposits and Non-deposit liabilities. See Appendix I for further 
information about the variables. 
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4.5. Methodology and Predictions 
Although there are a number of studies that offer some insights into how firms choose 
their capital structure, it is recognized that there is still much work to be done in order to 
strengthen the relationship between theoretical predictions and empirical results. Thus, 
in order to test the determinants of the capital structure of the UE27 banks the following 
regression was estimated: 
 
 =  + 	
	 + 	 + 	 + 	 +
  + ! + ! + "  
 
The dependent variable leverage ratio
 
(L) will be both the market leverage ratio 
and the book leverage ratio of bank i, in country c in year t. The explanatory variables 
are the natural logarithm of size (Ln(Size)), profitability (Prof), the market-to-book ratio 
(MtB), collateral (Coll), all lagged by one year, and a dummy for dividend payers (Div). 
Further ahead, we also add the risk (natural logarithm of asset risk, lagged one year) as 
explanatory variable, although its explanatory power has not been always consensual. 
The definition of all variables can be found in section 4.3 and Appendix 1. 
The regression includes time and country fixed effects (ct and cc) to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and across time that may be correlated 
with the explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level to account 
for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Gropp and Heider, 2009). 
Several alternative definitions of leverage have been used in the empirical 
research. Frank and Goyal (2004) consider five alternative definitions of leverage, 
although they focus more on the ratio of total debt to market value of assets (TDM). 
Gropp and Heider (2009) advance the following arguments in favor of using leverage 
(including non-debt liabilities) rather than debt as the dependent variable: 1) “unlike 
debt, is well defined (see Welch, 2007)”; and 2) “Leverage is a structure that increases 
the sensitivity of equity to the underlying performance of the (financial) firm”. Here, we 
adopt the same approach as Gropp and Heider (2009). The difference between market 
leverage (one minus the market equity ratio) and book leverage (one minus the book 
equity ratio) is particularly relevant for banks, because the regulatory capital is set on 
book capital, therefore using book leverage as the dependent variable can be directly 
(1) 
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related to the regulatory view of bank’s capital structure. Later in this section we also 
report the results when using Tier 1 regulatory capital as alternative dependent variable. 
As previously discussed, there are two different approaches on capital structure 
that are particularly prominent and under which the different theories can be grouped. 
They are the trade-off theories (tax based or agency costs based theories) and the 
asymmetric information theories (pecking order, signaling and market timing). Since 
these two perspectives are influential we will provide some discussion about which 
would be the probable patterns that might be expected underlying each theory. 
On the other hand, the regulatory capital may be considered the main driver of 
banks capital structure. Although, this pure regulatory perspective does not appear to 
apply to our sample of banks since the estimated coefficients in the equation (1) are 
statistically significant (see Tables 6 and 7). This means that the standard determinants 
of capital structure have at least some explanatory power of the bank’s capital structure 
decisions. Alternatively, Gropp and Heider (2009) suggest a less stark view of the 
impact of regulation in the banks’ capital structure decisions, called buffers view. 
According to this view, banks might hold capital buffers, if they face higher costs of 
issuing equity at short notice, in order to avoid falling below the minimum capital 
requirement. “It follows that banks facing higher cost of issuing equity should be less 
levered” (Gropp and Heider, 2009). 
Table 5 shows the predictions of each theory, concerning the relationship 
between leverage and each variable in analysis. Note that the regulatory view 
predictions were taken solely from Gropp and Heider (2009). 
 
Table 5 – Theory predictions 
 
Log(Size) + +/-
Market-to-Book Ratio + - - +
Profits - + +
Collateral +
Dividends + - +
Risk + - -
Assymetric Information Models
Trade-off Buffers 
ViewVariable Pecking 
Order Signaling
Market 
Timing
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Size 
Since size is an inverse proxy for volatility and for the costs of bankruptcy (Frank and 
Goyal, 2004), trade-off theory predicts that larger and more mature firms use more debt. 
Therefore, size (calculated as the logarithm of total assets30) should have a positive 
impact on debt capacity.  However, the size can also send information about the firm to 
the investors and increase their preference for equity relative to debt. In this case, 
signaling theory would entail a positive relationship between size and leverage. 
Frank and Goyal (2004) pointed out that the pecking order predictions are 
unclear concerning the firm size impact on leverage. “On the one hand, larger firms 
might have more assets in place and thus a greater damage is inflicted by adverse 
selection as in Myers and Majluf (1984). On the other hand, larger firms might have 
less asymmetric information and thus will suffer less damage by adverse selection as 
suggested by Fama and French (2002)” (Frank and Goyal, 2004). 
Buffers view suggests that the effect of bank size on the level of buffers is 
ambiguous ex-ante (Gropp and Heider, 2009). Larger banks may hold smaller buffers if 
they are better known by the market, but is also plausible that larger banks hold larger 
buffers if they are more complex and, therefore, asymmetric information became more 
relevant. 
 
Market-to-book ratio 
Following the trade-off theory, higher market-to-book ratio implies higher growth 
opportunities and thus higher costs of financial distress, therefore less debt is used. 
According to Myers (1977), highly levered companies are more likely to waste valuable 
future investment opportunities. Thus, firms expecting future growth opportunities 
ought to use a greater amount of equity finance.31 
If the market-to-book ratio is high, then issuing equity seems attractive and thus 
leverage will decline, which is in line with the Market-timing prediction. This recent 
theory suggests that when the equity market is relatively favorable (for instance, if the 
market-to book-ratio is high), firms tend to issue more equity. Frank and Goyal (2004) 
assert that Market-timing theory “makes correct predictions for the market-to-book […] 
                                                           
30 Alternatively, several studies compute size as the logarithm of net sales. 
31
 We follow e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) that stated “As suggested in Myers (1977), we use the ratio 
of the market value of assets to the book value of assets as a proxy for growth opportunities”.  
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However, by itself market-timing does not make any predictions for many of the 
patterns in the data that are accounted for by the tradeoff theory. If market timing is to 
stand as an independent theory, then considerable theoretical development is needed.” 
One empirical implication of the Ross (1977) signaling theory is that in a cross-
section the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases 
the market’s perception of value. Thus, it is expected a positive relationship between the 
variables leverage and market-to-book ratio. 
According to buffers view, banks with higher market–to-book ratios are 
expected to hold smaller buffers of equity, and then are higher leveraged. Since they are 
better known by investors and have more financial slack, they are expected to face 
lower costs associated with having to issue equity at short notice. (Gropp and Heider, 
2009). 
 
Profitability 
According to the trade-off theory higher profitability implies lower expected costs of 
financial distress. Hence, more profitable firms are expected to have more debt relative 
to assets. Furthermore, more profitable firms should carry more debt since they have 
more profits that need to be shielded from taxation.32 Nevertheless, “this prediction has 
often been criticized (see Myers, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; and Fama and 
French, 2002).” (Frank and Goyal, 2004) 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that “Jensen (1986) predicts a positive [effect of 
profitability on leverage] if the market for corporate control is effective and forces firms 
to commit to paying out cash by levering up. If it is ineffective, however, managers of 
profitable firms prefer to avoid the disciplinary role of debt, which would lead to a 
negative correlation between profitability and debt.” From the lenders perspective, it is 
preferable financing firms with higher estimated future operational cash-flows. 
According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) firms will 
prefer to finance with internal funds rather than debt, which predicts a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. 
                                                           
32
 Frank and Goyal (2004) “Higher profitability implies lower expected costs of financial distress and a 
greater desire for firms to shield profits from taxes, hence profitable firms are expected to have more debt 
relative to book assets. Predictions about how profitability affects market leverage ratios are unclear.” 
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We conclude that theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between 
profitability and leverage are contradictory. While models based on the trade-off the tax 
benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress predict a positive and strong 
relationship between debt ratios and past profitability, pecking order models predict a 
strong negative relationship between debt ratios and past profitability. 
Buffers view predicts a positive relationship between profitability and leverage 
based on the same explanation as given for the variable market-to-book ratio. 
 
Collateral 
If a large portion of a firm's assets are tangible, these can serve as collateral, reducing 
the risk of the lender experiencing agency costs of debt and, in the event of liquidation, 
these assets have more value. Therefore, the higher is the percentage of tangible assets 
on the balance sheet (tangible assets divided by total assets), the more lenders are 
willing to finance the firm. Thus, we can say that the trade-off theory predicts a positive 
relation between this factor and leverage. According to Frank and Goyal (2004) 
“Advertising and R&D often represent discretionary future investment opportunities, 
which are more difficult than “hard" assets for outsiders to value. The costs of financial 
distress are higher if a firm has more of these types of investments.” 
 
Dividends 
Within a trade-off perspective, Frank and Goyal (2004) give two possible explanations 
that support the idea that dividend paying firms would have less leverage. Firstly, they 
argue that dividend-paying firms have lower agency costs of equity and this allows 
firms to raise more equity. If so, then dividend payers should have less leverage. 
Secondly, they argue that perhaps dividend paying firms are those that generate more 
cash from operations relative to their investment opportunities, and so they pay out the 
difference. Such firms would be unlikely to raise more debt since that would incur the 
unnecessary transactions costs. 
What Frank and Goyal (2004) consider “worst” in the pecking order theory is its 
incorrect prediction that dividend paying firms should have greater leverage. “The 
dividend prediction stems from the fact that dividends require funds, and as discussed 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), they are treated as exogenous within the pecking 
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order.” Since dividends are part of the firm’s financing deficit (cash-out flow), it is 
expected that a dividend-payer firm use more debt, according to the order of preference 
of external sources of funds underlying the pecking order theory. 
Regulatory view follows that dividend paying banks, can be expected to face 
lower costs of issuing equity because they either are better known to outsiders, have 
more financial slack or can  obtain a better price. (Gropp and Heider, 2009) Therefore, 
dividend paying banks would be less leveraged. 
 
Risk 
Frank and Goyal (2004) state that “firms with more volatile cash flows face higher 
expected costs of financial distress and should use less debt. More volatile cash flows 
also reduce the probability that tax shields will be fully utilized.” This is consistent with 
the trade-off theory. 
Not surprisingly, if buffers are an important determinant of banks’ capital 
structure, we expect the level of banks’ leverage to be negatively related to risk. 
According to the pecking order, we can expect that firms with volatile stocks are 
firms whose perceptions are also quite volatile. It seems plausible that such firms suffer 
more from adverse selection and, therefore, have higher leverage.  
 
4.6. Results 
4.6.1. Market Leverage as Dependent Variable 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimating regression (1) when the dependent variable 
is market leverage, and compares these with the results obtained by Gropp and Heider 
(2009), Frank and Goyal (2004), Rajan and Zingales (1995). Although, they use similar 
models and we think it is appropriate to make this comparison to support our results, we 
should pay attention to the differences among all these studies, such as in the sample 
characteristics and alternative leverage measures.  
All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level, except on 
Dividend payer, which is significant at 5% or 10% level, depending on the sample 
period. R2 varies between 65% e 71%, what indicates a well explanatory power of our 
model. Banks Market leverage is positively related with Log Size and negatively related 
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with Market-to-book ratio, Collateral and Dividend payer. The relation between 
leverage and profitability is unclear, because the estimated coefficient sign varies, 
depending on the sample period. When compared to the results found in Gropp and 
Heider (2009), Frank and Goyal (2004), Rajan and Zingales (1995), estimated 
coefficients on Log Size, Market-to-book ratio and Dividend payer have the same sign, 
while on Collateral has opposite sign and on Profits is ambiguous (depending on the 
sample period). 
The negative sign of the coefficient on Profits in the period 2005-2011, in which 
the access to equity markets became tougher, is consistent with the pecking order theory 
prediction and follows Gropp and Heider (2009), Frank and Goyal (2004) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995). If in the short run, dividends and investments are fixed, and if debt 
financing is the dominant mode of external financing, then changes in profitability will 
be negatively correlated with changes in leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). In this 
period, the sign is also consist with the regulatory view predictions. In the period 1998-
2004, the sign of the coefficient on Profits is consistent with the trade-off theory in the 
sense that more profitable firms hold more debt in order to shield such profits from 
taxation.  
The negative sign of the coefficient on Collateral is the opposite of the results 
presented for the non-financial firms and the 200 large U.S. and European banks and do 
not confirm the positive relationship with leverage predicted by trade-off theory. A 
possible explanation is given by Rajan and Zingales (1995), by quoting Berger and 
Udell (1994) who show that firms with close relationships with creditors need to 
provide less collateral. The reason why they argue this is because the relationship (and 
more informed monitoring by creditors) substitutes for physical collateral. 
The effect of Log Size, Market-to-book ratio, Profits (only in the period 1998-
2004) and Dividend payer on bank leverage supports the trade-off theory. Pecking order 
only predicts the effect of Profits in the period 2005-2011. The buffers theory of excess 
capital seems to holds only for Log Size and Profits (only in the period 1998-2004). 
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Table 6 – Explanatory power of standard determinants of bank market leverage 
The columns 1, 2 and 3 show the result of estimating the regression (1). The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 
1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. The dependent variable is market leverage. The regression includes time and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
bank level. The column 4 reproduces estimates from Table V, column 1 of Gropp and Heider (2009).  The column 5 reproduces estimates from Table 8, column 7 of Frank and Goyal (2004). The column 6 
reproduces estimates from Table 9, panel B, first column of Rajan and Zingales (1995). Note that the definition of leverage differs across the papers and that Frank and Goyal (2004) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) do not use country or time fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level respectively. Size is defined as the total book assets in millions of euros. Market-
to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the total tangible assets as a percentage of 
the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays dividends, 0 otherwise. Market leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus market value of equity divided by 
market value of assets. See Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
 
Log(Size) 0.023 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 *** 0.006 *** 0.021 *** 0.03 ***
standard error
elasticity
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.463 *** -0.267 *** -0.335 *** -0.560 *** -0.022 *** -0.08 ***
standard error
elasticity
Profits 0.758 *** -1.007 *** 0.025 *** -0.298 *** -0.104 *** -0.60 ***
standard error
elasticity
Collateral -0.343 *** -0.210 *** -0.247 *** 0.020 * 0.175 *** 0.33 ***
standard error
elasticity
Dividend payer -0.028 * -0.019 ** -0.017 ** -0.019 *** -0.092 ***
standard error
elasticity
Industry Leverage 0.618 ***
standard error
elasticity
Constant 1.269 *** 1.026 *** 1.079 *** 1.360 *** -0.037 ***
standard error
Number of observations 486 826 1,312 2,415 63,144 2,207
R2 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.79 0.29 0.19
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0,007)
[0,529]
(0.044) (0.075) (0.063) (0,039) (0,004)
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0,004) (0,002)
[-0,020] [-0,106]
[0,006] [0,314]
(0.104) (0.051) (0.057) (0,012) (0,004)   (0,03)
[-0,018] [-0,008]
(0.217) (0.302) (0.335) (0,097) (0,003)   (0,07)
[-0,683] [-0,170]
(0.034) (0.048) (0.038) (0,034) (0,000)   (0,01)
[0,007] [0,082]
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0,001) (0,000)   (0,00)
Rajan and 
Zingales (1995)
Table V, col. 1 Table 8, col. 7
Table 9, Panel B 
(US)
Dependent variable
Market leverage
Gropp and 
Heider (2009)
Frank and Goyal 
(2004)EU27 Banks
1998-2004
EU27 Banks
2005-2011
EU27 Banks
1998-2011
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4.6.2. Book Leverage as Dependent Variable 
In the case of banks the difference between market and book values is of central importance, 
since capital regulation is imposed on book but not on market values. Table 7 shows the results 
of the estimating regression (1) when dependent variable is book leverage33, and compare these 
with the results obtained by Gropp and Heider (2009), Frank and Goyal (2004) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). When statistically different from zero, the estimated coefficients have quite 
similar signs to those observed when market leverage is the dependent variable. However, the 
coefficients on Market-to-book ratio in the periods 2005-2011 and 1998-2011, on Profits in the 
period 1998-2011 and Dividend payer in the periods 1998-2004 and 2005-2011 are not 
statistically significant, therefore no conclusions can be drawn in these particular cases. R2 
varies between 50% e 63%, and although quite satisfactory, indicates a weaker explanatory 
power than that obtained using market leverage.  
Recalling the predictions of buffers view presented in Table 5, banks with higher 
market-to-book ratios, higher profits and that pay dividends should be more leveraged (hold 
less discretionary capital) because it is expected that they face lower costs of issuing new 
equity if they fall below the minimum regulatory capital. Therefore, such banks do not need to 
carry large capital buffers, instead they can be highly leveraged. Regardless of using either 
market or book leverage to estimate regression (1), the effect of these three explanatory 
variables indicate the opposite of the regulatory view prediction (only the sign of the estimated 
coefficient on Profits is in line with the buffers view in the period 1998-2004 for both market 
and book leverage; and in the periods 1998-2004 and 1998-2011 for market leverage). The 
effect of the bank Size on leverage is consistent with the predictions of both trade-off theory 
and regulatory view. 
So, we do not find strong evidence that the sign and significance of the effect of most 
variables on bank leverage are consistent with the buffers view of banks’ capital structure. On 
the contrary, the standard cross-sectional determinants of firms’ capital structure seem to have 
stronger explanatory power of capital structure decisions of EU27 listed banks, either using 
market or book leverage. Together, these results may suggest that a pure regulatory view does 
not apply to banks’ capital structure, in the same fashion as suggested in Gropp and Heider 
(2009).   
                                                           
33
 We report the results when using the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio as the dependent variable later in this section. 
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Table 7 – Explanatory power of standard determinants of bank book leverage 
The columns 1, 2 and 3 show the result of estimating the regression (1). The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 
1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. The dependent variable is book leverage. The regression includes time and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
bank level. The column 4 reproduces estimates from Table VI, column 1 of Gropp and Heider (2009).  The column 5 reproduces estimates from Table 9, column 7 of Frank and Goyal (2004). The column 6 
reproduces estimates from Table 9, panel A, first column of Rajan and Zingales (1995). Note that the definition of leverage differs across the papers and that Frank and Goyal (2004) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) do not use country or time fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level respectively. Size is defined as the total book assets in millions of euros. Market-
to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the total tangible assets as a percentage of 
the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays dividends, 0 otherwise. Book leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus book value of equity divided by the 
book value of assets. See Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
 
Log(Size) 0.022 *** 0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.006 *** 0.013 *** 0.06 ***
standard error
elasticity
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.212 *** -0.012 -0.066 -0.066 *** -0.002 *** -0.17 ***
standard error
elasticity
Profits 0.434 * -1.048 *** -0.222 -0.210 *** -0.214 *** -0.41 ***
standard error
elasticity
Collateral -0.341 *** -0.205 *** -0.247 *** 0.032 *** 0.157 *** 0.50 ***
standard error
elasticity
Dividend payer -0.020 -0.016 -0.014 ** -0.009 *** -0.078 ***
standard error
elasticity
Industry Leverage 0.649 ***
standard error
elasticity
Constant 1.046 *** 0.795 *** 0.839 *** 0.886 *** 0.038 ***
standard error
Number of observations 486 826 1,312 2,415 64,057 2,079
R2 0.63 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.16 0.21
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0,009)
[0,532]
(0.065) (0.085) (0.057) (0,022) (0,005)
(0.015) (0.01) (0.007) (0,003) (0,086)
[-0,009] [-0,009]
[0,009] [0,270]
(0.105) (0.064) (0.064) (0,009) (0,005) (0,04)
[-0,012] [-0,013]
(0.247) (0.38) (0.277) (0,063) (0,004) (0,10)
[-0,076] [-0,012]
(0.071) (0.061) (0.05) (0,016) (0,001) (0,01)
[0,006] [0,050]
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0,001) (0,001) (0,01)
Rajan and 
Zingales (1995)
Table VI, col. 1 Table 9, col. 7 Table 9, Panel A (US)
Dependent variable
Book leverage
Gropp and 
Heider (2009)
Frank and Goyal 
(2004)EU27 Banks
1998-2004
EU27 Banks
2005-2011
EU27 Banks
1998-2011
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4.6.3. Controlling for Asset Risk 
Corporate finance theory comprises diverse predictions about the effect of risk on the 
capital structure decisions. While pecking order theory supports a positive relationship 
between risk and leverage, trade-off and signaling theories and buffers view drive a 
negative relationship between these two variables. However, Gropp and Heider (2009) 
suggest that the negative effect of risk on leverage is in line with standard corporate 
finance arguments. In order to test if risk holds in our sample, we add to the equation (1) 
the natural logarithm of Assets risk (Risk), lagged by one year, as explanatory variable. 
We obtain the equation (2). The results are shown in Table 8, using either market 
leverage or book leverage as dependent variable, and are confronted with those obtained 
by Gropp and Heider (2009) for the same empirical specification. 
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Gropp and Heider (2009) wanted to examine if regulation in its pure form, 
which constitutes an overriding departure from the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance 
proposition, could force riskier banks to hold more book equity. If so, omitting risk 
from the equation would result in spurious significance of the remaining variables. Our 
results show that, although estimated coefficient on risk is always significant at the 1% 
level (except on book leverage 1998-2004 that is 5%), it does not exclude the remaining 
variables that keep its significance almost unchanged. When market leverage is the 
dependent variable, only the coefficients on profit (period 1998-2011) and on Dividend 
payer (periods 1998-2004 and 2005-2011) are no longer statistically significant. 
Comparing to the results of Table 7, estimated coefficients on Market-to-book ratio 
(1998-2004) and Profits (1998-2004) lose their statistical significance when using book 
leverage ratio. This result also indicates that our model fits better when dependent 
variable is market leverage. 
Introducing risk, R2 slightly increase (lies between 72% and 76% when using 
market leverage and between 56% and 65% when using book leverage). Risk has a 
negative effect on bank leverage, measured either in market or book values, in every 
(2) 
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tested period, what is consistent with the regulatory view.34 Although, Gropp and 
Heider (2009) refer two studies where is suggested that regulation itself does not 
explain the negative relationship between risk and leverage.35 Frank and Goyal (2004) 
stated that “firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of financial 
distress and should use less debt. More volatile cash flows also reduce the probability 
that tax shields will be fully utilized.” This is also consistent with the trade-off view. 
 
 
                                                           
34
 It is important to note that during our sample period, different regulation was in place (Basel I until 
2004 and Basel II 2005 onwards) and a financial crisis onset in mid 2007.  
35 
“For example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) conclude that regulatory pressures cannot explain the 
relationship between risk and capital in the US during the 1990s. Calomiris and Wilson (2004) find a 
negative relationship between risk and leverage using a sample of large publicly traded US banks in the 
1920s and 1930s when there was no capital regulation.” (Gropp and Heider, 2009) 
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Table 8 – Explanatory power of standard determinants of bank market and book leverage after controlling for asset risk 
The columns 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 show the result of estimating the regression (2). The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, 
from 1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. The dependent variable is market leverage on columns 1, 2 and 3 and is book leverage on columns 5, 6 and 7. The regression includes time 
and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. The column 4 reproduces estimates from Table VII, column 1 of Gropp and Heider (2009) and the column 8 reproduces 
estimates from Table VII, column 3 of Gropp and Heider (2009). Note that Gropp and Heider (2009) also use country and time fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and 
the 10% level respectively. Size is defined as the total book assets in millions of euros. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by 
the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the total tangible assets as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays 
dividends, 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the annualised unlevered standard deviation of daily stock return. Book leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus book value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Market 
leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus market value of equity divided by market value of assets. See Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
Book leverage
Log(Size) 0.018 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.005 *** 0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.020 *** 0.006 ***
standard error
elasticity
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.328 *** -0.196 *** -0.223 *** -0.472 *** -0.128 0.049 0.021 -0.020
standard error
elasticity
Profits 0.525 *** -0.864 *** -0.032 -0.262 *** 0.288 -0.979 *** -0.280 -0.192 ***
standard error
elasticity
Collateral -0.284 *** -0.165 *** -0.198 *** 0.020 ** -0.305 *** -0.173 *** -0.212 *** 0.032 ***
standard error
elasticity
Dividend payer -0.023 -0.010 -0.014 ** -0.019 *** -0.017 -0.009 -0.011 ** -0.009 ***
standard error
elasticity
Log(Asset risk) -0.042 *** -0.042 *** -0.047 *** -0.024 *** -0.026 ** -0.032 *** -0.035 *** -0.013 ***
standard error
elasticity
Constant 0.960 *** 0.826 *** 0.810 *** 1.195 *** 0.853 *** 0.636 *** 0.635 *** 0.799 ***
standard error
Number of observations 486 824 1,310 2,415 486 824 1,310 2,415
R2 0.73 0.76 0.72 0.80 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.58
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.088) (0,022)(0.098) (0.088) (0.084) (0,047) (0.108) (0.114)
(0.01) (0,002)
[-0,028] [-0,014]
(0.01) (0.011) (0.009) (0,004) (0.011) (0.011)
(0.006) (0,003)
[-0,021] [-0,009]
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0,004) (0.015) (0.009)
(0.058) (0,008)
[0,006] [0,009]
(0.094) (0.044) (0.049) (0,010) (0.095) (0.059)
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
(0.216) (0,058)
[-0,015] [-0,011]
(0.196) (0.243) (0.251) (0,087) (0.229) (0.341)
(0.059) (0,015)
[-0,576] [-0,023]
(0.057) (0.049) (0.042) (0,036) (0.081) (0.073)
Market leverage
EU27 Banks Gropp and 
Heider (2009)
Table VII, col. 1
EU27 Banks
(0,001)
[0,105] [0,102]
Gropp and 
Heider (2009)
T able VII, col. 31998-2004 2005-2011 1998-2011 1998-2004 2005-2011 1998-2011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0,001)
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4.6.4. Introducing Leverage as Lagged Dependent Variable 
Now, we introduce dynamics in the model by adding the lagged dependent variable 
(Lict-1) on the right side of the regression (2) as explanatory variable. Given the 
continuity of many time series processes, it could be particularly interesting to test if its 
value in a given year is influenced by its value in the previous year. Consider the 
following equation. 
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It is possible rewritten the equation (3) considering that Xict-1 collects the bank level 
variables (Log Size, Market-to-book ratio, Profits, Collateral, Dividend payer and Asset 
Risk) and B collects the beta coefficients. 
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According to equation (4) it can be seen that two factors are responsible for the 
variation of Lict over time, the direct effect of the variation in X, called short-run effect 
and the continuous variation of the short-run relationship, called long-run effect. This 
long-run effect by each variable is given by the factor B/(1 – δ), which provides the 
effect of one-unit change in equilibrium X on equilibrium Lict. 
The results of the model estimation are shown in Table 9. R2 lies between 90% 
and 97%. Lagged variable estimated coefficient in the period 1998-2004 is not 
statistically significant, either for market or book leverage, which might seem that the 
adjustment occurs entirely in the short run (lag of one year), due to the variation in X.  
On the contrary, in the period 2005-2011, the coefficient sign of the lagged 
variable, is statistically significant at 1% level and positive (respectively 0.451 and 
0.410, for market and book leverage), what means that the variation of the 6 explanatory 
variables lasts in time. Bring it together with the fact that these variables are no longer 
statistically significant, it suggest that from 2005 onwards capital structure of banks 
(3) 
(4) 
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takes longer time to adapt to changes in these standard cross-sectional determinants. 
Thus, changes to the banks’ capital structure carry out slower. 
This can eventually be explained by the remarkable changes in those variables 
that do not allow the immediate adjustment of bank’s capital structure. The introduction 
of Basel II in 2005, that define tighter rules concerning the bank capital ratios, and the 
financial crisis that began in mid 2007, may help to explain these results, since both 
changes required from banks a great and protracted capital adjustment. 
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Table 9 – Including lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable 
The columns 1, 2 and 3show the results of estimating the regression (4) when the dependent variable is market leverage. The columns 4, 5 and 6 show the results of estimating the regression (4) when the 
dependent variable is book leverage. The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 1998 to 2011, with available data in 
the Bankscope database. The regression includes time and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and 
the 10% level respectively. Size is defined as the total book assets in millions of euros. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by 
the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the total tangible assets as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays 
dividends, 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the annualised unlevered standard deviation of daily stock return. Book leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus book value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Market 
leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus market value of equity divided by market value of assets. See Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
Dependent variable
Log(Size) 0.030 ** 0.051 *** 0.036 *** 0.026 ** 0.011 0.010
standard error
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.226 *** 0.011 -0.114 -0.041 * -0.021 -0.048 *
standard error
Profits 0.283 *** -0.128 0.131 0.079 * -0.164 0.053
standard error
Collateral 0.048 -0.103 ** -0.036 0.050 -0.079 -0.035
standard error
Dividend payer -0.031 *** 0.008 0.002 -0.018 *** 0.011 0.003
standard error
Log(Asset risk) -0.018 *** -0.002 -0.008 ** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
standard error
Market Leverage (t-1) -0.122 0.451 *** 0.313 *
standard error
Book Leverage (t-1) -0.048 0.410 *** 0.421 **
standard error
Constant 0.881 *** 0.010 0.361 0.739 *** 0.460 *** 0.475 **
standard error
Number of observations 500 841 1,341 500 841 1,341
R2 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.94 0.92
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.191
0.0010.006 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
0.104 0.109 0.169
0.105 0.145
0.1980.130 0.219 0.254 0.127 0.135
0.006 0.007 0.007
0.0360.039 0.046 0.037 0.033 0.049
0.0050.012 0.007
0.0930.108 0.187 0.117 0.043 0.106
0.011
2005-2011
0.0280.046 0.052 0.079 0.024 0.019
0.013 0.020 0.012 0.011 0.010
Market leverage
1998-2004 2005-2011 1998-2011 1998-2004
Book leverage
1998-2011
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4.6.5. Regulatory Capital as Dependent Variable 
Finally and following Gropp and Heider (2009), we are going to test the capital Tier 1 ratio as 
an alternative dependent variable. The Tier 1 capital ratio has risk-weighted assets in the 
denominator, so it is different from the book equity to book assets ratio used before to compute 
the book leverage ratio. This alternative analysis tests in what extent the standard determinants 
of capital structure decisions still have explanatory power when the dependent variable is a 
capital ratio set by regulators. 
Looking at our sample, we conclude that there is no wide variation in tier 1 capital ratio 
across banks and time, and banks hold discretionary capital quite above the minimum of 4% 
required under Basel I and Basel II (see the distribution of Tier 1 capital ratio in Appendix 3). 
Rewriting the Equation (2) using the alternative dependent variable Tier 1 capital ratio 
(E), we obtain the Equation (5).  
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The results are shown in Table 9. R2 lies between 30% and 38%, that is quite bellow the values 
obtained when estimating equation (2). Market-to-book ratio and Dividend payer estimated 
coefficients are no more statistically significant for any period of our sample, in line with the 
results of Gropp and Heider (2009). Whenever a coefficient is significant, the effect is 
consistent with the results obtained in the equation (2), when book leverage ratio is the 
dependent variable. Thus, it confirms our initial results that recognized some ability to standard 
determinants of non-financial firms to explain the capital structure decisions of EU27 banks, 
during our sample period.36 
The estimated coefficient on asset risk is statistically close to zero in the period 1998-
2004, but becomes significant at the 1% level in the period 2005-2011. A plausible reason to 
this happening can be the capital requirements generally risk insensitive, until 2004 under Basel 
I (the relevant regulation during the period 1998-2004). From 2005 onwards, with the Basel II 
introduction, riskier banks can be formally required to hold more capital. This evidence is in 
favor of the regulation as a determinant of bank’s capital structure. However, Gropp and Heider 
                                                           
36
 Gropp and Heider (2009) carry out a deeply analysis of the effect of regulation by examining the situation of 
banks that are close to violating their capital requirement. 
(5) 
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(2009) refer complementary evidence, in the literature, which suggest that regulatory pressures 
cannot explain the relationship between risk and capital. 
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Table 10 – Explanatory power of standard determinants of bank leverage using regulatory capital as the dependent variable 
The columns 1, 2, 3 show the result of estimating the regression (2). The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 1998 to 
2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. The dependent variable is Tier 1 capital ratio.. The regression includes time and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank 
level. The column 4 reproduces estimates from Table XII, column 1 of Gropp and Heider (2009. Note that Gropp and Heider (2009) also use country and time fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level respectively. Size is defined as the total book assets in millions of euros. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. 
Profits are the return on assets given by the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the total tangible assets as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose 
value is equal to 1 if a bank pays dividends, 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the annualised unlevered standard deviation of daily stock return. Tier 1 capital ratio as defined by the Basel Committee. See Appendix I 
for further information about the variables. 
 
 
Log(Size) -0.011 *** -0.008 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 ***
standard error
elasticity
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.076 0.021 0.002 -0.019
standard error
elasticity
Profits 0.465 0.717 *** 0.626 *** 0.423 ***
standard error
elasticity
Collateral 0.141 *** 0.067 ** 0.092 *** 0.097 ***
standard error
elasticity
Dividend payer -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 0.004
standard error
elasticity
Log(Asset risk) 0.012 0.017 *** 0.011 0.010 ***
standard error
elasticity
Constant 0.278 *** 0.194 *** 0.193 *** 0.265 ***
standard error
Number of observations 387 713 1,031 2,007
R2 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.51
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.092) (0.045) (0.039) (0,028)
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0,002)
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0,004)
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0,012)
(0.419) (0.203) (0.174) (0,090)
(0.049) (0.04) (0.025) (0,020)
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0,001)
Dependent variable
Tier 1 capital ratio
EU27 Banks Gropp and Heider 
(2009)
Table XII, col. 11998-2004 2005-2011 1998-2011
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
 
Despite the abundant research that has been produced on the firm’s capital structure, a 
theory based on robust empirical support and widely accepted among academics and 
real world firms has not yet been reached. The optimal capital mix still remains a puzzle 
(Frank and Goyal, 2004; Marques and Santos, 2003; Myers, 1984). 
Furthermore, such considerable research excludes or gives little attention to 
banks37 (and financial institutions in general). Thus, there is still room for empirical 
validation of various theoretical prepositions applying to capital structure decisions of 
banks. This dissertation, although not absent of limitations and shortcomings, aims to be 
a modest contribution to fill this gap. 
We explored whether the standard determinants of capital structure are 
significant factors in determining the level of bank leverage in the EU27 countries, 
using a sample of 145 listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies from 25 
countries, from 1998 to 2011. We used a number of standard factors, proposed by 
previous empirical research, that are related to the capital structure decisions (Size, 
Profit, Market-to-book Ratio, Collateral, Dividend, Asset Risk) to test if they still hold 
for our sample of EU27 banks. 
The evidence in this empirical study suggests that larger banks, banks with lower 
market-to-book ratio or non-dividend paying banks have higher leverage, confirming 
the previous empirical evidence.38  
The relationship between leverage and profitability is unclear, because the effect 
of profits over the banks’ leverage varies depending on the period analysed. During the 
period between 2005 and 2011, in which the access to capital markets became tougher, 
banks with higher profits hold less debt, what is consistent with the pecking order 
theory prediction and follow the prior empirical findings. During the period between 
1998 and 2004, the positive relation between banks’ profitability and leverage is 
consistent with the trade-off theory in the sense that more profitable firms hold more 
debt in order to shield such profits from taxation. 
                                                           
37
 More recently, to the best of our knowledge, Hasan (1997), Santos (2003), Marques and Santos (2003), 
Gropp and Heider (2009). 
38
 Gropp and Heider (2009), Frank and Goyal (2004), Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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What is striking is the negative relationship established in this study between the 
ratio of assets eligible as collateral and the leverage (measured by the market leverage 
ratio), which contradicts all the theoretical predictions and empirical facts. Our findings 
are the opposite of the results presented for both non-financial firms and large U.S. and 
European banks and do not confirm the positive relationship predicted by the trade-off 
theory. In fact, firms holding more collateral should be likely to have more leverage, 
since the collateral might be given as guarantee to the creditors. The only possible 
explanation we can see to support our results is that creditors would substitute collateral 
for monitoring actions on banks activity, when have a closer and trusty relationship with 
them. Further investigation is needed to clarify this point. 
The buffers theory of excess capital holds only for the relationship between 
leverage and banks’ size and profits (the latter only in the period 1998-2004). Banks 
with higher profits can be expected to face lower costs of issuing equity, if need it, 
because they should be better known in the market (lower asymmetric information) and 
should have more financial slack, so they do not need to hold relevant capital buffers 
(capital above the regulatory minimum). Regarding the predicted effect of the bank size 
on leverage, our findings also confirm that larger banks may hold smaller buffers 
because they are better known in the market. 
Since capital regulation is imposed on book values, for banks the difference 
between market leverage ratio (calculated using the market value of equity) and book 
leverage ratio (calculated using the book value of equity) is of central importance. 
When we use the book leverage ratio, some of the 5 corporate standard determinants of 
capital structure lose their explanatory power, but whenever they remain relevant they 
confirm the findings established for market leverage. This result indicates that our 
model fits better for market leverage. 
According to the buffers view, banks with higher market-to-book ratios, higher 
profits and that pay dividends do not need to carry large capital buffers and so they can 
be higher leveraged. Nevertheless, the results of our model do not confirm these 
predictions, excepting for the relationship between profits and leverage from 1998 to 
2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of firms’ capital structure seem to 
have stronger explanatory power of capital structure decisions of EU27 listed banks, 
either using market or book leverage. These results suggest that a pure regulatory view 
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does not apply to banks’ capital structure, in the same fashion as suggested in Gropp 
and Heider (2009). Even when we test the capital Tier 1 ratio as an alternative 
dependent variable, after controlling for Asset risk, the results still suggest that 
regulation and capital buffers are not the main factor influencing the choice of capital 
structure by banks. 
In order to test the effect of the level of risk on the capital structure decisions, a 
proxy for risk was added to the model as explanatory variable of the leverage ratio39. 
Our results show a significant relationship between risk and leverage, although it does 
not exclude the remaining factors that keep their importance almost unchanged. Risk 
has a negative effect on leverage (measured either in market or book values), what is 
consistent with both the trade-off theory and buffers view. For instances, regulators 
should impose higher levels of capital on banks with riskier assets, in other to 
deleverage their balance sheet, banks with riskier cash flows face higher expected costs 
of financial distress and thus should use less debt and more volatile cash flows diminish 
the probability that tax shields will be fully used. 
Moreover, the results suggest that, from 2005 onwards, the effect of the standard 
cross-sectional determinants of banks leverage lasts in time. Thus, the capital structure 
of banks takes longer time to adapt to changes in these variables. The introduction of 
Basel II in 2005, that defines tighter rules concerning the bank capital ratios, and the 
financial crisis that began in mid-2007, may help to explain these results, since both 
changes required a great and protracted capital adjustment by banks. 
In sum, our results seem to indicate that, in some extent, standard cross-sectional 
determinants of non-financial firms’ capital structure also apply to EU27 listed banks. 
However, the result holds better for market leverage ratio than for book leverage ratio. 
In contrast, our results offer weak support to the capital regulation as an important 
driver of banks’ capital structure decisions, i.e., the specific regulation faced by banks 
related to their capital appears to have little impact on banks’ capital structure changes. 
  
                                                           
39According to Gropp and Heider (2009), when the objective is to examine whether regulation in its pure 
form could force riskier banks to hold more book equity, omitting risk from the equation would result in 
spurious significance of the remaining variables. 
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 Appendix 1 – Variables definition and source 
 
 
Variables Definition Bankscope/Datastream fields
Book Leverage Ratio 1- (book value of equity / book value of assets) Equity (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Market Leverage Ratio
1- (market value of equity (=number of shares * end of year 
stock price) / market value of bank (=market value of equity + 
book value of liabilities))
Total Book Value Liabilities = Total Assets - Equity
Equity (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Number of shares
End of year stock price
Size Total book value of assets Total Assets (eur million)
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value of assets / Book value of assets
Market value of assets = Market value of bank
Equity (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Number of shares
End of year stock price
Profits EBIT / book value of assets
EBIT = (pre-tax profit + interest expenses)
Profit before Tax (eur million)
Interest expenses (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Collateral (Total securities + Cash and due from + Other tangible assets) / Book value of assets
Total Securities
Cash and Due From Banks
Fixed Assets
Dividend dummy 1 if the bank pays a dividend in a given year, 0 otherwise Cash Dividend Paid (eur million)
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Variables Definition Bankscope/Datastream fields
Asset risk
Annualised standard deviation of daily stock price returns * 
(market value of equity / market value of bank)
Daily adjusted price
Equity (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Number of shares
End of year stock price
Deposits (Book) Total deposits / Book value of assets
Total Deposits, Money Market and 
Short-term Funding (eur million)
Total Assets (eur million)
Non-deposit liabilities (Book) Book leverage – Deposits (Book) (see above)
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Appendix 2 – Correlations matrix 
The sample consists of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. Total book 
assets are in millions of euros. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Profits are the return on assets given by the EBIT over the book value of assets. Collateral is the 
total tangible assets as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Dividend payer is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if a bank pays dividends, 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the annualised unlevered 
standard deviation of daily stock return. Book leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus book value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Market leverage ratio is equal to 1 minus market value of equity 
divided by market value of assets. Deposits (book) are the total deposits as a percentage of the total book value of assets. Non-deposits liabilities (book) is the book leverage ratio minus deposits (book). See 
Appendix I for further information about the variables. 
 
Total 
book 
assets
Market-to-
Book 
Ratio
Profits Collateral Dividend payer
Asset 
Risk
Book 
leverage 
ratio
Market 
leverage 
ratio
Deposits 
(book)
Non-
deposits 
liabilities 
(book)
Total book assets 1.000
Market-to-Book ratio -0.100 1.000
Profits -0.097 0.381 1.000
Collateral 0.249 0.059 0.013 1.000
Dividend payer 0.097 -0.014 0.127 0.059 1.000
Asset Risk -0.153 0.669 0.252 0.305 -0.064 1.000
Book leverage ratio 0.193 -0.145 -0.151 -0.493 -0.052 -0.629 1.000
Market leverage ratio 0.222 -0.565 -0.272 -0.414 -0.059 -0.785 0.854 1.000
Deposits (book) -0.272 -0.092 -0.033 -0.353 -0.089 -0.278 0.426 0.308 1.000
Non-deposits liabilities (book) 0.427 -0.040 -0.061 0.121 0.073 -0.113 0.178 0.195 -0.815 1.000
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Appendix 3 – Distribution of Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
The chart shows the distribution of banks’ regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (equity over risk weighted assets as defined in the basel 
regulatory framework) for 1,114 bank-year observations in our sample of all the listed commercial banks and bank-holding 
companies, in the 27 countries of the European Union, from 1998 to 2011, with available data in the Bankscope database. 
 
 
 
 
